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Should You Compete or Cooperate with Your Schoolmates?
*
 
Building upon some education studies finding that cooperative behaviour in class yields 
better achievements among students, this paper presents a simple model showing that free 
riding incentives lead to an insufficient degree of cooperation between schoolmates, which in 
turn decreases the overall achievement. A cooperative learning approach may instead 
emerge when competitive behaviour is negatively evaluated by schoolmates, especially when 
the class is more homogeneous in terms of students’ characteristics (e.g., ability). Empirical 
evidence supporting our model is found using the 2003 wave of the OECD Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) survey on students’ literacy levels. A competitive 
learning approach has a positive individual return (higher in comprehensive educational 
systems), while student performance increases with the average cooperative behaviour, 
particularly in tracked educational systems. 
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1 1 1 1. Introduction . Introduction . Introduction . Introduction       
       
Educational  research  can  be  broadly  distinguished  into  two  main  bodies.  The 
first  one  treats  schooling  as  something  that  is  done  to  students  rather  than 
something that is done by students, as in the education economics literature that 
estimates  educational  production  functions  (see  Monk,  1990).  Students  are 
considered as the “raw material” that is combined with other inputs (typically 
school resources) into the educational production function to produce an output 
that is often measured in terms of schooling attainment or school grades. Hence, 
students are given a completely passive role and little insight is given on the 
importance of student behaviour and student attitudes for educational outcomes. 
On the other extreme, the second type of research, which will be partly reviewed 
below, is largely psychological and pedagogical and often based on case studies 
that put the student and the teacher at the core of the learning process and that 
typically refuse any generalisation across students, schools or countries. 
 
In this paper we try to bridge the two streams of literature. From the pedagogical 
and  psychological  literature  we  borrow  the  idea  of  the  centrality  of  student’s 
attitudes  and  behaviours  in  the  learning  process.  Starting  from  the 
educationalist’s research that found a positive relation between group-learning 
and  knowledge,  we  investigate  the  theoretical  implications  of  students’ 
competitive and cooperative behaviours for learning. At the same time we use a 
research  tool  typical  of  education  economists,  i.e.  the  “educational  production 
function” and an approach based on the investigation of large data sets rather 
than  of  small  case  studies.  We  use  data  from  the  2003  wave  of  the  OECD’s 
Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment  (PISA),  which  gathers 
comparable information on students enrolled in several schools located in many 
different countries and provides a standardized measure of student competences 
(our proxy of learning). Despite the disadvantage of requiring a higher degree of 
generalization because we have much less information on the group than in case 
studies,  we  think  that  a  large  scale  survey  offers  nonetheless  some  clear 
advantages such as the opportunity to investigate empirical regularities that go 
beyond a single class or a single school. 
 
While  economists  did  not  analyze  the  learning  process  from  the  student’s 
cooperation-competition point of view, the educationalists’ research on the matter 
is  rather  extensive.  We  summarize  here  some  of  their  contributions,  with  the 
main purpose of stressing the findings that are also relevant from an economic 
point of view.1  
 
The learning process is affected both by intrinsic and by extrinsic motivation. The 
latter comes from the external environment, out of the person, who acts with the 
anticipation  of  punishments  and  rewards,  such  as  getting  teacher  and  peer 
                                                 
1 See Abrami et al. (2000) and Watkins (2005) for a thorough review of the literature. Strijbos and 
Fischer  (2007)  discuss  methodological  issues  in  interdisciplinary  research  on  collaborative 
learning.     3 
praise, acquiring a good grade, obtaining parental reward. For instance, earning 
high marks may enhance learning whenever marks are important to students as 
signals for either the continuation of the educational career, or for a potential 
employers in the labour market. In contrast, intrinsic motivation occurs when the 
learning activity and the learning environment per se elicit motivation, because 
the  student  finds  studying  enjoyable  and  acquiring  knowledge  is  a  reward  by 
itself. According to Malone and Lepper (1987), the factors that enhance intrinsic 
motivation can be divided into individual factors (e.g. curiosity) and interpersonal 
ones (e.g. feeling satisfaction by helping  others, or when others recognize and 
appreciate one’s accomplishments).  
 
Educationalists usually consider intrinsic motivation as more effective than the 
extrinsic one in enhancing the acquisition of knowledge, and in a parallel fashion 
they  regard  group  learning  as  more  effective  than  individual  learning.  For 
instance, Shachar and Fischer (2004) claim that group investigation is “designed 
to  enhance  intrinsic  motivation  by  virtue  of  its  emphasis  on  a  high  level  of 
student autonomy and responsibility in making decisions regarding the selection 
and  implementation  of  study  projects  [...],  as  well  as  receiving  and  offering 
considerable support from, and assistance to, group-mates”. In addition, group 
work  requires  caring  for  others,  thus  reinforcing  the  sense  of  community 
belonging.2  Discussing  with  classmates  involves  reconciliation  of  multiple 
perspectives through the medium of dialogue, and this collaboration develops a 
higher abstraction and elaboration skills.  
 
Moreover,  group  activity  allows  for  individualised  attention  for  low  achieving 
students, as well as providing an opportunity to high achievers to improve their 
understanding of the subject while illustrating it to the group. In group learning 
students  of  different  abilities  obtain  a  personalised  motivation,  provided  that 
group composition does not mix extremes that are too far apart. Students with 
different  levels  of  achievement  appreciate  differently  group  learning.  Rather 
common in this stream of literature are the findings that low achievers seem to 
gain more from group learning than high achievers,3 and that high achievers are 
more inclined to gain recognition of their level of ability through competition in 
the class.4 All these features characterize also the model that is presented in the 
next section. 
 
Increasing  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  group  learning  yields  superior 
outcomes in terms of student’s motivation and achievement. Whatever teaching 
technique  is  adopted  in  a  class,  and  irrespective  of  students’  age  or  subject 
                                                 
2 See for instance Watkins (2005) and Cowie and Berdondini (2001). 
3 Hoek et al (1999) reports a mathematical reasoning test conducted among 7th grade students, 
where  high  achievers  benefited  more  than  low  achievers  (differential  effect),  but  the  same 
outcome was reversed in other types of tests. Low achievers seem also benefit from additional 
attention from the teacher under group learning (remedial effect).  
4 See Shachar and Fischer (2004), p.83.   4 
taught,  most  literature  stresses  the  advantages  of  cooperative  learning.5 
According to the advocates of this approach, the main advantage of passing from 
a teacher-centred learning (namely “learning = being taught”) to group learning 
is exactly the appeal to individual intrinsic motivation for learning (“learning = 
individual sense-making”, according to Watkins, 2005).  
 
Cooperative learning, however, is not a spontaneous phenomenon: 
  
Effective group work requires students to share ideas, take risks, disagree with and 
listen  to  others,  and  generate  and  reconcile  points  of  view.  These  norms  do  not 
necessarily  pervade  classrooms.  Students  are  used  to  working  individually,  being 
rewarded  for  right  answers,  and  competing  with  each  other  for  grades.  Placing 
students in groups does not mean they will actually cooperate. There is considerable 
and disturbing evidence that students often do not behave pro-socially. One problem 
is failure to contribute. When groups create a single product and receive one grade, 
students sometimes do not do their fair share. (Blumenfeld et al., 1996, p.38). 
 
As  the  quotation  makes  it  clear,  groups  work  according  to  implicit  or  explicit 
norms  that  regulate  individual  contributions  and  individual  accountability  is 
essential to ensure a generalised participation to cooperation. 
 
As economists, not only we are particularly sensitive to the caveat raised by the 
quotation above, but we are also tempted to stress the role of explicit incentives 
as represented by extrinsic motivations. Summarizing the previous literature we 
cannot miss the strong similarities that learning in groups has with the provision 
of public goods. Group learning (the public good) has positive externalities, since 
all students seem to improve their achievements. However, individual incentives 
favour free riding and these incentives are increasing in student’s ability, since 
the most brilliant students are those who contribute more to group learning, with 
a  greater  benefit  for  the  “worst”  (i.e.,  the  less  able)  ones.  Group  norms  may 
reverse  individual  incentives,  but  they  are  strongly  dependent  on  the 
environment.  In fact,  the  emergence  of  cooperation  is  influenced  by  the  socio-
cultural environment where learning takes place. The environment shapes the 
incentives  and  the  attitudes  of  participants,  rewards  or  penalises  the  leaders, 
reinforces or weakens stereotypes. 
 
In the sequel we expand this line of argument by proposing a model where each 
student  allocates  her  effort  between  two  types  of  activity,  cooperation  or 
competition.  Cooperation  may  be  thought  to  correspond  to  group  learning, 
providing  positive  externalities  in  terms  of  knowledge  to  the  entire  group  of 
students irrespective of individual contribution. Competition has a private return 
only,  which  is  increasing  in  ability.  As  a  consequence,  under  spontaneous 
                                                 
5  Zammuner  (1995)  reports  evidence  of  text  quality  of  individual  writing  Vs.  dyadic 
writing/revision  in  an  experiment  conducted  among  4th  graders.  She  finds  higher  quality 
improvement under individual writing and dyadic revision. Hanze and Berger (2007) study the 
impact of the jigsaw cooperative learning method (i.e. when each student is assigned a specific 
task  in  group  activity)  in  12th  grade  physics  classes,  showing  positive  effects  on  intrinsic 
motivation, experience of competence (especially among low achievers) and activation of deeper 
level processing.   5 
ordering  there  is  an  excess  of  competition  and  limited  cooperation.  However, 
when group norms are modified (for instance because a teacher may favour group 
learning or because peers penalize selfish behaviour), these conclusions can be 
reversed. 
 
In the second part of the paper, we bring the theoretical predictions of the model 
to  the  data,  using  the  PISA  2003  survey,  where  students  self-declare  their 
learning attitudes towards cooperation and competition. Although such a dataset 
does not allow to observe the process that effectively occurs in class, it has the 
great  advantage  of  providing  a  large  scale  analysis  based  on  a  standardized 
measure  of  performance,  while  the  pedagogical  and  psychological  literature 
usually rely on small case studies. We study the correlation between students’ 
attitudes and performance, showing that there is an individual incentive to be 
competitive, but a group advantage in adopting cooperative strategies. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a model that 
frames  cooperation  and  competition  in  learning,  providing  some  testable 
theoretical predictions. In Section 3 we provide some empirical evidence drawn 
from an international student survey, which contains information about student 
learning attitudes and performance. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2 2 2 2. Theoretical Framework . Theoretical Framework . Theoretical Framework . Theoretical Framework       
 
The  relative  performance  within  one's  school  is  a  useful  signal  of  students’ 
abilities, which certainly affects their likelihood of finding a good job. However, 
such a signal is imperfect, and the employers adopt other devices, like interviews, 
to compare candidates who often come from different schools. There are therefore 
two  components  that  are  salient  in  this  framework.  The  first  is  a  relative 
component, i.e. the knowledge acquired in comparison with the students coming 
from the same school, as certified by the final grade. The second is an absolute 
component, not captured by the relative ranking, that needs to be evaluated in 
order to compare students coming from different schools. 
 
Many  studies  in  education,  psychology  and  economics  document  how  children 
may  be  more  clearly  motivated  by  short-run  gratification  (corresponding  to  a 
relative performance) rather than less tangible long-run rewards (which can be 
assimilated to an absolute performance - see Chelonis, Flake, Baldwin, Blake and 
Paule 2004, Harbaugh and Krause 1998, Bettinger and Slonim 2006). However, 
in what follows we focus on the absolute level of knowledge, thereby assuming 
that  students  encompass  the  long  run  consequences  of  their  choices.  Such  a 
framework, which turns out to be much simpler from the algebraic point of view, 
defines a lower bound to competition. If we were to assume that students also 
care about being in the highest possible position in the ladder, we would stress 
more their incentives to compete, without changing the main implications of the 
model.   
   6 
 
2.1 The Production of Knowledge 
 
We assume that each student cares about her optimal level of knowledge, which  
can be produced privately (through individual learning activities) or collectively 
(through group learning). 
 
The  simplest  way  to  model  the  decision  of  time  allocation  is  to  consider  that 
learning  has  an  opportunity  cost  which  is  identical  among  students,  and  for 
simplicity  described  by  a  quadratic  disutility  function.  On  the  contrary,  the 
choice between individual or group learning requires clarifying  the production 
process of knowledge. 
     
In  what  follows,  we  partly  deviate  from  the  educational  literature  previously 
outlined, which views “cooperative learning” as that mainly taking place in class 
and induced by  teachers. Indeed, we adopt a different and broader concept of 
“cooperative  learning”  (or  “group  learning”),  which  refers  to  situations  where 
students are free to choose how to allocate their time and whether to work alone 
or  in  groups.  Therefore,  it  mainly  applies  to  study  time  outside  class  hours, 
including for instance student homework done in group. 
 
We assume that private knowledge is produced through individual learning. This 
requires  not  sharing  knowledge  acquisition  with  classmates,  possibly  to  be 
recognised as better than others in class.6 Symmetrically, we assume that public 
knowledge is achieved through learning in a group, which necessarily requires 
sharing  knowledge  with  others.  An  example  can  be  described  by  fluency  in 
language. Private knowledge occurs whenever a student learns the meaning of a 
specific  word  on  her  own.  We  speak  of  private  knowledge  even  if  the  word  is 
known by a group of students, or by the whole class, provided that every student 
has learned the word without interacting with her classmates. Public knowledge 
instead corresponds to  the case where an entire class can use a specific word 
thanks to group interaction. Another example is given by homework: the time 
students  spend  solving  their  assignments  individually  enters  the  definition  of 
effort  devoted  to  the  production  of  private  knowledge.  In  contrast,  if  students 
work  in  groups,  what  they  learn  by  doing  homework  is  classified  as  public 
knowledge.  
 
The  crucial  issue  in  our  model  is  how  students’  time  is  allocated  between 
individual  learning  (production  of  private  knowledge)  and  group  learning 
(production  of  public  knowledge).  We  face  here  the  usual free  riding  problem: 
everybody  has  the  incentive  to  allocate  the  maximum  amount  of  time  to  the 
                                                 
6 For the sake of simplicity in the theoretical model we adopt as the relevant student’s community 
a class. However, group learning (or cooperative learning) may also take place among students 
from different classes but from the same school, especially when we consider student homework. 
In fact, due to the nature of the data used in the empirical analysis (OECD PISA) we will consider 
a  school  as  the  relevant  student  community.  Alternatively,  one  might  assume  that  classes’ 
behaviours are homogenous within the same school.    7 
acquisition of private knowledge, while hoping that at the same time all the other 
fellow students invest enough time producing public knowledge. Using one of the 
aforementioned examples, this corresponds to a student participating in group 
work  only  to  get  the  solutions  of  the  homework  costly  elaborated  by  her 
classmates, and then spending most of her time studying alone in order to get 
higher marks. The underlying reason is that the time devoted to group learning 
has a small individual return, since it is diluted among all the participants. The 
higher the number of students, the lower the individual return on time spent 
producing  public  knowledge  (e.g.,  because  larger  communities  makes  it  more 
difficult individual interaction). In the limit case where there is a continuum of 
agents and the individual contribution is negligible, the optimal contribution to 
the production of public knowledge is equal to zero (which we can indicate as a 
“purely competitive outcome”). 
 
The simplest way of formalizing such a framework is the following:7 
 






i i i i i s p s p U - - + a =   (1) 
 
where  i U  is individual utility,  i p  is the time devoted to individual learning by 
student  i, whose ability is  i a . The interaction  i i p a  represents what we term 
private knowledge, i.e. what students learn on their own. The time devoted to 













1 ~ .    (2) 
 
We assume that the production of public knowledge is decreasing in students’ 
heterogeneity as represented by the standard deviation of their ability ( a s ). The 
underlying  idea  is  that  peer  effects  are  more  intense  in  more  homogenous 
environments. Therefore, mixing extremes that are too far apart implies a loss in 
terms of knowledge on both sides: the best students waste (part of) their time 
                                                 
7 Identical results are obtained by means of a Cobb-Douglas utility function subject to an explicit 
time  constraint,  provided  that  the  exponents  are  chosen  appropriately  (in  order  to  obtain 
meaningful results)  and that the upper bound of the distribution of ability is kept sufficiently low 
to ensure a positive amount of leisure. In that case the solutions for 
* p  and 
* s  can be interpreted 
as  the  fraction  of  time  devoted  to  each  type  of  learning.  Notice  also  that  in  the  specification 
adopted above, it makes a significant difference whether the disutility of learning is modelled 
separately for private and public knowledge, or instead considering the sum of the time devoted 
to both tasks. If a student cares only about the total time spent studying, but she is indifferent 
about its allocation between individual or group learning, the outcome will be a corner solution 
where she spends her time only on the task yielding the highest marginal return. In contrast, 
modelling two separate costs allows internal solutions to emerge, because it implies that students 
prefer  to  diversify  time  allocation  between  the  two  activities.  We  regard  this  as  a  more 
appropriate  model,  since  we  rarely  observe  students  adopting  extreme  behaviours  like  “pure 
competitor” or “pure cooperator”.   8 
interacting with the least brilliant students, if the latter do not fully grasp the 
arguments put forward by the former.  
 
Moreover, for group learning to have a fostering effect on total knowledge, it is 
necessary that the output is higher than the sum of the inputs: we have to make 
sure  that  1 < sa .  This  happens,  for  instance,  when  ability  is  uniformly 
distributed  over  a  unitary  support  (i.e.  [ ] 1 , 0 U » a ),  which  also  has  the  great 
advantage of simplifying the algebra. 
 
From the first order conditions the following optimal choices emerge: 
 





* max arg   (3) 








* max arg   (4) 
 
with  the  contribution  to  public  knowledge  that  decreases  in  students’ 
heterogeneity  and  group  size,  getting  to  zero  when  the number  of  students  is 
sufficiently large. Abler students are those who contribute more, and less able 
students are those who benefit more from public knowledge whenever its amount 
is positive (since they obtain more public knowledge than they contribute to). 
 
The first testable implication of these joint assumptions is that the effort exerted 
in the production of both private and public knowledge is increasing in ability. 
The latter increases more than the former whenever  1 < san , i.e. when students 
belong to a small and homogeneous class. 
     
As  already  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of  this  section,  the  optimal  amount 
devoted  to  the  production  of  private  knowledge  would  be  even  higher  if  the 
relative evaluation in class is explicitly modelled. This happens because at the 
margin also the density of knowledge (intuitively, the fraction of students that 
can be overcome by increasing one's effort by a small amount) affects the choice, 
making individual learning more rewarding.8  
 
We define a learning approach as cooperative when a larger amount of time is 




i i p s > .  (5) 
 
                                                 
8  This  amounts  to  adding  in  (1)  a  term  like  ( ) ( ) ∫ a a b
i p
d p f
0 ,  summarizing  that  the  student 
experiences a higher utility proportional to the fraction of fellows with a lower level of private 
knowledge, given that public knowledge is the same for everybody. If only the relative evaluation 
matters, on the other hand, such a term should replace the private  knowledge term in (1).    9 
A necessary condition to always observe a cooperative behaviour at individual 
level  is    1 < san ,  i.e.  to  belong  to  an  extremely  small  and  homogeneous  class. 
Notice that when this condition is satisfied, all students in the group display a 
cooperative behaviour regardless of their ability level.  
 
Therefore, to avoid this trivial solution of the model as well as to ensure that 




< s < n n
. 
 
Could we expect to observe a degree of cooperation larger than that implied by 
self-interest?  The  answer  is  positive,  if  we  modify  individual  preferences,  for 
instance  assuming  that  students  enjoy  cooperative  learning  because  of  the 
opportunity of interacting with their classmates. Moreover, a selfish behaviour in 
terms of learning is likely to be punished in terms of exclusion from the social 
activities inside and outside the class. We model the fact that students care about 
the opinion of their classmates turning our model into a psychological game in 
which opponents' beliefs enter the utility function: 
 




1 ~ 2 2 > m - m - - - + a = i i i i i i i s p s p s p U .  (6) 
 
The last term indicates that a cooperative learning approach  i i p s >  generates a 
good  reputation  among  the  classmates,  therefore  implying  a  positive  utility, 
while the opposite holds when a competitive learning approach  i i s p >  is chosen.9 
 
If students do not care about the relative evaluation but only about the level of 
knowledge, the optimal amounts become respectively: 
 
  [ ]   α max arg i




  (7) 











.  (8) 
 
The opinion of classmates, modelled in this simple way, has the effect of shifting 
time  from  competitive  to  cooperative  learning  without  changing  the  overall 
amount  of  time  devoted  to  studying.  Both 
*
i p   and 
*
i s   are  still  increasing  in 
ability, the former dominating the latter since we assumed that  1 > san . In other 
words, the incentive to cooperate does not change significantly in accordance with 
individual  ability  whenever  n  is  sufficiently  large  and/or  the  class  is  very 
heterogeneous. . . .       
                                                 
9 Alternatively, we might interpret the last term as an altruistic component, which ensures a 
positive utility when the student behaves in a cooperative manner.   10 
       
The  threshold  level  of  ability  that  divides  the  students  characterized  by  a 
competitive learning approach from those characterized by a cooperative learning 
approach  is  obtained  by  equating  equations  (7)  and  (8).  Competitive  learning 










i   (9) 
 
which is increasing in the strength of classmates’ beliefs, and decreasing in the 
degree of heterogeneity ( a s )  and the size (n) of the group. 
 
A second testable implication of our model is therefore that ceteris paribus we 
expect  a  positive  correlation  between  ability  and  propensity  to  adopt  a 
competitive learning approach. 
     
Now let us see what happens to the amount of knowledge of the whole class, as 
measured  for  instance  by  a  standardized  test  that  mimics  the  outcome  of  job 
market interviews concerning pupils from different classes/schools. We define the 
total knowledge  K  of a class simply as the sum of the total knowledge acquired 









  (10) 
 
where  s p K i i i
~ * + a = ,  given  that  individual  total  knowledge  is  the  outcome  of 
individual  learning  ( i i p a )  and  shared  knowledge  (s ~ ).  Notice  that  public 
knowledge affects the outcome of every student, irrespective of both individual 
participation to group activities ( i s ) and of individual ability ( i a ). In this way, 
the  public  knowledge  s ~   is  counted  n  times  when  computing  the  score  of  the 
class.  
 
As  long  as  the  public  knowledge  exceeds  the  sum  of  its  inputs,  which  in  our 
model is ensured by the assumption that  1 < sa , the total knowledge of a class 
turns  out  to  be  increasing  in  the  degree  of  cooperation  within  the  class  by 
construction.  When  class  (group)  size  is  sufficiently  large,  i.e.  ¥ ® n ,  and 
reputation  about  being  a  cooperative  person  is  irrelevant,  i.e.  0 = m ,  a  purely 
competitive outcome emerges with individual contribution to public knowledge 
going to zero: as a consequence also  0 ~ = s . The total knowledge, assuming ability 














0 =  

 
 a = a a = a a = a = ∫ ∫ ∫ d d p d k K i i .  (11) 
   11 
When the opinions of classmates enter students' utility functions, affecting their 
propensity  to  cooperate,  the  picture  changes  sharply,  since  public  knowledge 
becomes positive also in the case of an infinitely large group:  
 
  ( )











1 1 ~ d d s s .  (12).  
 
Similarly, total knowledge increases (given  1 < sa  by assumption): 
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+ - = + = ∫ ∫ d d s p K i
  (13) 
 
The same results hold qualitatively when the number of students in the group is 
finite. When the incentive to cooperate is based on the individual return only, i.e. 
0 = m , the public knowledge coming from cooperative learning is:  
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1 1 1 ~   (14) 
 
and total knowledge therefore is: 
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1 ~ ~   (15) 
 
When the classmates’ opinion enters students' utility functions, public knowledge 
increases and becomes:   
 
  ∑ ∑ ∑









































1 1 1 ~   (16) 
 
while total knowledge is also greater (since  1 < sa  by assumption ) and equal to: 
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  (17) 
 
Of course, this also translates into a higher average knowledge in the class. A 
third testable implication is therefore that the stronger the social preferences for 
cooperation, the larger the number of students who adopt a cooperative learning   12 
approach, the larger the amount of public knowledge produced and therefore the 
larger the amount of average knowledge. In other words, total knowledge should 






What  can  affect  the  preferences  for  cooperation?  In  more  homogeneous 
environments,  the  opinion  of  classmates  is  likely  to  be  more  relevant.  The 
simplest  way  to  model  such  a  feature  would  be  to  make  social  preferences  a 
(decreasing)  function  of  students’  heterogeneity  ( ) a s m .10  As  a  consequence, 
tracked  educational  systems,  characterized  by  a  more  homogeneous  body  of 
students within schools (since they are often sorted by ability into tracks), should 
display  a  relatively  higher  degree  of  cooperation  and  a  lower  degree  of 
competition.  
 
Moreover, since we believe that group working is more productive when involving 
extremes  that are not  too far apart, we have  modelled public  knowledge as a 
decreasing  function  of  students’  heterogeneity.  If  this  is  the  case,  tracked 
educational systems should also display a higher return to aggregate cooperative 
behaviour. 
 
In  a  nutshell  what  happens  is  that  choosing  the  optimal  amount  of  learning 
based  on  individual  incentives  only  might  be  Pareto  inferior.  In  fact,  the 
investment  in  group  learning  is  inefficiently  low  because  of  the  free  riding 
problem. The presence of strong preferences for cooperation within the class, as 
well as belonging  to  a small and homogeneous group, may partially overcome 
such an inefficiency. 
 
Summarizing,  some  testable  implications  can  be  obtained  from  the  previous 
model:  
-  the effort exerted in the production of both private and public knowledge 
is increasing in ability; 
-  the  “best”  students  (i.e.,  most  able)  should  be  characterized  by  a 
competitive  learning  approach,  while  the  opposite  holds  for  the  worst 
students; 
-  students'  knowledge  should  increase  with  the  individual  competitive 
behaviour  and  with  the  average  cooperative  behaviour  (while  no  direct 
effect should be associated to the private cooperative behaviour and to the 
average competitive behaviour);  
- tracked educational systems should display a relatively higher degree of 




                                                 
10  This  prediction  is  for instance  in  line  with  findings  in  Alesina  and La  Ferrara  (2000)  that 
participation in social activities is lower in more unequal and heterogeneous communities.   13 
3 3 3 3.  .  .  . Empirical Evidence Empirical Evidence Empirical Evidence Empirical Evidence       
       
The  OECD's  PISA  surveys  are  designed  to  collect  information  on  real-life 
competences  from  15-year-old  students,  on  a  comparable  cross-country  base.11 
These surveys are conducted every three years, and cover reading, mathematical 
and scientific literacy, and problem solving, with a dominant area in each wave. 
The  2003  wave  has  been  conducted  in  41  countries  with  a  primary  focus  on 
mathematical  literacy.  The  PISA  survey  provides  an  extremely  rich  set  of 
explanatory variables that can be linked to students' performance, ranging from 
individual characteristics and family background, to characteristics of the school 
and of the education system. 
 
In the PISA questionnaire there are also some questions concerning students' 
learning approach. Two sets of questions concern their preference for competitive 
learning12  and  cooperative  learning13  respectively,  which  are  not  mutually 
exclusive.  In  fact,  it  may  well  be  that  a  student  wants  to  outperform  their 
classmates  and  at  the  same  time  having  preferences  for  cooperative  learning. 
This information about students’ learning attitudes has been summarised by the 
OECD  researchers  (using  principal  component  analysis)  into  two  variables 
(COOPLRN and COMPLRN).14 
 
How can we use the data from PISA survey to test the predictions of the model 
outlined in the previous section? Several assumptions are necessary in order to 
compare the model with the data.  
                                                 
11 “PISA seeks to measure how well young adults, at age 15 and therefore approaching the end of 
compulsory schooling, are prepared to meet the challenges of today’s knowledge societies. The 
assessment  is  forward-looking,  focusing  on  young  people’s  ability  to  use  their  knowledge  and 
skills to meet real-life challenges, rather than merely on the extent to which they have mastered 
a specific school curriculum.” (PISA 2004, p.20). 
12 Students have to assess how much they agree with the following statements (questions n.37a-
37c-37e-37g-37j):  
-I would like to be the best in my class in mathematics  
-I try very hard in mathematics because I want to do better in the exams than the others  
-I make a real effort in mathematics because I want to be one of the best 
-In mathematics I always try to do better than the other students in my class  
-I do my best work in mathematics when I try to do better than others. 
13 Students have to assess how much they agree with the following statements (question n.37b-
37d-37f-37h-37i): 
-In mathematics I enjoy working with other students in groups 
-When we work on a project in mathematics, I think that it is a good idea to combine the ideas of 
all the students in a group 
-I do my best work in mathematics when I work with other students  
-In mathematics, I enjoy helping others to work well in a group 
-In mathematics I learn most when I work with other students in my class. 
14 Wallace et al. 2002 show that individual understanding of student survey statements is related 
to the level of student achievement, and is also variable over time: “There is increasing evidence 
to suggest that members of a classroom do not share the same learning environment; neither do 
they share the same meanings for the constructs used to measure the environment.” (ibidem, 
p.134). However, in the PISA case the statement refers to individual aptitude and not to class 
perception, and therefore we feel less troubled in using it.   14 
 
In our model, individual knowledge is function of individual endowments (that 
we termed ability) and behaviour (in terms of effort towards individual and group 
learning). Unfortunately, the PISA dataset does not contain any reliable proxy 
for innate ability. However, if we take a sufficiently broad definition of ability as 
anything that contributes to the child learning and that is possessed by the child 
before  entering  the  school,  then  all  family  related  characteristics  can  be 
considered as proxies for the (observable) component of ability. Moreover, these 
observable parental characteristics (e.g., education) will also be partly correlated 
with  a  child’s  innate  ability  (due  to  transmission  of  genes).  Any  unobservable 
component  of  ability  will  then  end  up  in  the  residual  of  any  regression  of 
students’ test scores on family background.  
 
PISA surveyed students by  schools and not by classes, with an average of 33 
students tested per school. After excluding data from schools with less than ten 
students, we take school averages as the best available proxy of  class averages.  
We use students’ test scores as a measure of the knowledge possessed by each 
student.15 We take students’ attitudes expressed with respect to competition Vs. 
cooperation with other students as proxies for the allocation of their effort in the 
direction of individual learning or group learning, respectively. For each student 
in the sample we compute the average attitude in the school towards competitive 
and cooperative learning, excluding his/her own opinion. 
 
From the original dataset (276,165 observations), we drop countries where the 
distribution  of  test  scores  is  too  much  dissimilar  from  the  remaining  of  the 
sample  and/or  there  are  too  many  missing  values  in  family  background 
information (101,472 cases excluded).16 By excluding individuals in schools with 
less than 10 students we loose other 2,694 observations. We also omit students 
not enrolled in the modal  grade (43.269), because they could represent biased 
sub-samples  (either  in  terms  of  ability,  or  in  terms  of  attitudes  toward 
cooperating with others, for repeating students who might face rather dissimilar 
peers). Finally, keeping only the observations without missing information on all 
the covariates we are left with 99,727 students spanning 24 countries (descriptive 
statistics are summarized in Table 1, while Table 2 displays the breakdown by 
country).  
 
Under this set of assumptions, let us confront the predictions of our model with 
the empirical evidence in  the data.  We know from the extensive literature on 
student performance (see among the others Wößmann, 2003, or Ammermüller, 
2005)  that  individual  test  scores  are  positively  correlated  with  a  bunch  of 
variables, although scholars fiercely disagree about their causal interpretation in 
                                                 
15  Actually, PISA  data  contain  five  plausible  values  for  each  student,  since each  student  was 
tested on a subsample of questions. We use here the average across the five plausible values. 
16  The  countries  excluded  are  Brazil,  France,  Greece,  Indonesia,  Latvia,  Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg,  Macao  (China),  Mexico,  New  Zealand,  Portugal,  Slovakia,  Thailand,  Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. 
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some cases (see for instance Hanushek, 1997, Vs. Greenwald et al., 1996, on the 
role  played  by  school  resources).  Among  such  variables  there  are  family 
background (parental education, index of parental socio-economic status, number 
of  books  at  home,  internet  connected  computer  at  home,  proxy  for  durables 
possession),  some  proxies  of  school  resources  (instructional  time,  number  of 
computers, class size) and some institutional indicators (existence of central exit 
examination systems, source of funding). 
 
Let  then consider learning attitudes.  The theoretical  model  predicts  that both 
effort exerted producing individual knowledge and time devoted to cooperation 
should  increase  with  ability,  therefore  displaying  a  positive  correlation.  The 
sample  correlation  between  the  competitive  and  cooperative  attitude  is  a 
statistically significant 0.29. 
 
Our theoretical model has been set up assuming that a person exhibits either a 
competitive  learning approach (whenever 
* *
i i s p > ) or a cooperative one (in the 
opposite case), and that she would be more likely to adopt the former behaviour 
the  higher  her  ability.  However,  questions  concerning  a  student’s  learning 
approach are not mutually exclusive in the dataset. A student can display at the 
same  time  both  a  stronger  willingness  to  outperform  the  others  and  a  higher 
propensity to cooperate than another student. For this reason we have tried to 
capture the prevailing attitude of students by taking the difference between the 
two opinions. The assumption underneath is that a competitive learner is more 
likely  to  express  stronger  support  for  a  competitive  behaviour  than  for  a 
cooperative one. 
 
In  Table  3  we  have  reported  the  correlation  of  this  measure  (COMPLRN  minus 
COOPLRN) with two alternative definitions of family background, used to proxy 
the observable component of students’ ability. In column 1 we have considered 
the highest education and occupational prestige in the parent couple; in column 2 
we have replaced these two attributes with an aggregate measure, which also 
contains information related to household possessions (variable ESCS - index of 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Status).  In  both  cases  the  dependent  variable 
exhibits a positive correlation with the measures of family background, in line 
with  the  prediction  of  the  model  that  the  effort  exerted  in  the  production  of 
private knowledge should be increasing in ability more than the effort exerted in 
group learning. We also find evidence of the fact that girls have less competitive 
and more cooperative attitudes than boys.  
 
We remind the reader that the incentives to exert effort in group learning were 
parameterised on  m (measuring the utility impact of classmates’ opinions) and 
a s   (the  heterogeneity  in  students’  abilities).  We  argued  that  in  more 
homogeneous  environments  social  control  is  stronger,  and  students  should 
therefore care more about the perception of their behaviour by other classmates. 
If tracked educational systems can be thought as characterised by higher m, then 
we  should  observe  the  prevalence  of  less  competitive  attitudes  and  more   16 
cooperative ones in such countries.17 In the data, we find evidence consistent with 
this prediction. There are significant cross-country variations in this attitude, as 
captured  by  the  estimated  country  fixed  effects,  which  are  also  reported  in 
graphical form in Figure 1. Cooperative attitudes seem to be prevalent among 
Nordic  countries  (Sweden  being  an  exception),  while  competitive  attitudes 
dominate in Anglo-Saxon and Eastern Asian countries. 18 Moreover, cooperative 
learning  is  more  frequent  among  countries  adopting  a  tracked  educational 
system.However, we cannot properly test for the presence of different levels of 
cooperation/competition across countries. The reason is that countries may differ 
on  many  other  dimensions  (including  religion,  cultural  attitudes,  strength  of 
family ties, etc.), which may affect the average degree of cooperation/competition 
over and above the type of educational system. Hence, this drawback prevents us 
from safely interpreting as supporting evidence for our model the fact that most 
of the countries characterized by tracked educational systems exhibit low fixed 
effects in Figure 1, where the dependent variable is the difference between the 
competitive and the cooperative behaviour.  
 
We now consider the correlation between acquired knowledge, individual ability 
and competitive/cooperative attitudes. In Table 4 we report OLS estimates of the 
correlation  of  students  test  scores,  measures  of  family  background  and  our 
measure of attitudes. Country fixed effects are included; heteroskedastic robust 
standard errors are clustered by school.  
In column 1 we consider the individual attitudes toward competition/cooperation, 
in column 2 we consider the school averages (computed excluding his/her own 
attitude)  and  finally  in  column  3  we  include  both  individual  and  school-level 
measures. We are not surprised to find that the test score displays a positive 
association with alternative measures of family background (including parental 
education, parental occupational prestige, computer facilities and books at home, 
possession  of  durables).  We  also  include  a  proxy  of  individual  effort,  which  is 
given by the amount of hours per week spent on “Homework or other study set by 
your teachers”.  Thus the individual level of knowledge is positively associated 
with  (the  observable  components  of)  ability  and  effort.  We  also  include  two 
(admittedly)  imperfect  proxies  for  the  size  of  the  relevant  student  group:  the 
school  size  and  the  student/teacher  ratio,  since  we  want  to  see  whether  the 
incentives  to  cooperate  decline  in  larger  communities  (i.e.  the  returns  to 
cooperation are lower in large groups). When we consider individual attitudes, we 
find that best performing students are also those who express stronger support 
for individual learning, while those more in favour of group activity are also those 
with  lower  performance.  In  other  words,  an  individual  competitive  attitude  is 
positively associated to individual acquisition of knowledge, while a cooperative 
                                                 
17  We classify countries as “comprehensive” or “tracked” on the basis of whether students were 
attending one or more secondary school types - see footnote of Table 1. 
18 Curiously enough we find that Asian countries generally rank high in terms of competitive 
attitudes. However, despite common beliefs that Confucian heritage favours cooperation, Phuon-
Mai  et  al.  (2005)  show  that  the  same  culture  creates  an  obstacle  to  effective  cooperation  in 
learning.   17 
attitude  shows  a  negative  correlation  with  it,19  but  only  in  comprehensive 
educational  systems.  Notice  that  these  individual  incentives  to  compete  are 
strengthened  in  larger  communities  (higher  student/teachers)  and/or  in  more 
heterogeneous environments (school systems that are not tracked). This is in line 
with  the  prediction  of  the  model  that  since  tracked  educational  systems  are 
characterized by a lower heterogeneity they should also display a higher return 
to cooperative attitudes. 
 
More surprising are  the correlations with school-level (i.e. collective) attitudes 
reported in column 2 of Table 4. Here we observe a reversal of signs. Other things 
being  constant,  students  in  schools  where  competitive  attitudes  are  prevalent 
obtain  lower  knowledge,  while  the  opposite  situation  is  observed  when 
cooperative attitudes towards learning occur. When considering the institutional 
features  of  a  country,  we  observe  that  the  average  competitive  attitude  is 
associated to a slightly more negative premium in comprehensive systems, while 
the reward to the prevalence of average cooperative attitudes is twice as large in 
tracked educational systems. If we consider that tracked educational systems are 
more homogeneous in terms of student abilities (since tracking is usually done 
according to children’s potential ability and past school performance) our results 
suggest  that  cooperation  is  more  convenient  among  classmates  that  are  more 
similar one to each other. 
 
In column 3 of Table 4 we combine both individual and collective attitudes, and 
both sets of results are confirmed. Results therefore remind us a hawk-dove game 
insofar as it pays being competitive while all the others are cooperative, because 
one obtains the benefit both of the private good (individual learning) and of the 
public good (the public knowledge). Unlike the hawk-dove game, however, this is 
not an anti-coordination game. In contrast, all students end up doing the same 
thing in equilibrium, namely investing an inefficiently low amount of time in the 
production of public knowledge. This situation is quite consistent with the results 
of our theoretical model, in which individual knowledge increases with individual 
competitive  behaviour  and  with  average  cooperative  behaviour.  However,  the 
model  does  not  consider  negative  externalities  from  the  average  competitive 
behaviour (which for instance could be rationalized by means of sabotage), and it 
does not predict a negative impact of individual cooperative behaviour.  
As to the results concerning aggregate behaviour, we know from other studies 
(Hanushek  and  Wößmann,  2006)  that  a  tracked  educational  system  has  a 
negative impact on average students’ performance. However, in these studies it is 
sometimes hard to identify the effect of tracking due to the potential correlation 
with other unobserved country characteristics. In this respect, we include country 
fixed effects in our analysis (which partly capture intercept effects of tracking 
and  country-level  unobservables)  while  investigating  the  differential  effect  of 
tracking  on  students’  performance  via  its  interaction  with  student’s  level  of 
cooperation.  We  find  that  test  scores  are  higher  when  average  cooperation  is 
                                                 
19 Notice that there is no causal implication in these correlations, because in accordance with our 
model  both  variables  display  a  spurious  correlation  with  the  unobservable  component  of 
individual ability.   18 
higher, but in tracked systems only. In our view this reinforces our argument: 
tracked systems might be associated to a lower student performance (intercept 
effect), but at the same time tracking  might have a positive effect on student 
knowledge both by increasing the level of student cooperation and by raising the 
return to cooperation. This means that the effect of tracking might turn out to be 
even more negative when these effects on student behaviour are neglected and it 
might even turns positive when they are accounted for. This is also consistent 
with  the  claim  of  the  educationalists  that  group  learning  enhances  intrinsic 
motivations,  and  consequently  knowledge,  provided  that  students  are  not  too 
different among each other.   
 
Finally,  we  want  to  test  whether  these  attitudes  had  a  different  impact  at 
different  levels  of  student’s  knowledge  (which  is  correlated  to  unobservable 
components  of  ability  once  we  control  for  family  background  according  to  our 
model).  In  Table  5  we  report  quantile  regressions  at  three  points  of  the 
distribution  of  test  scores  (25th,  50th  and  75th  percentile).  Standard  errors  are 
obtained  from  bootstrapping  (100  replications).  The  relevant  coefficients 
(incorporating also the effect of the interaction with the dummy “tracking”) are 
also plotted in Figure 2. When considering comprehensive educational systems, 
we  observe  that  competitive  attitudes  display  returns  that  are  increasing  in 
ability,  while  the  opposite  applies  to  cooperative  attitudes.  Thus,  other  things 
constant,  the  “best”  students  have  a  higher  individual  return  to  competition, 
while the “worst” students have lower disincentives when preferring cooperative 
learning.    As  far  as  tracked  educational  systems  are  concerned,  incentives  to 
individual  competitive  behaviour  are  lower  but  remain  increasing  in  student 
performance, while disincentives for individual cooperative attitudes disappear 
independently of the student level of knowledge.  
 
 
4 4 4 4.  .  .  . Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions       
 
In the present paper we show another occurrence of “failure of composition”. A 
theoretical model shows that private incentives do not necessarily coincide with 
public ones. In a public good game (where social knowledge represents the public 
good  at  hand)  this  leads  to  a  suboptimal  provision  of  cooperation,  due  to  free 
riding  incentives.  The  free  riding  problem  is  attenuated  whenever  reputation 
among peers is relevant for the individual and/or when heterogeneity in group 
abilities  is  limited.  The  first  effect  is  obtained  by  means  of  a  positive  utility 
impact  of  cooperative  behaviour  via  classmates’  opinions,  while  the  second 
derives  from  the  assumption  that  the  production  of  public  knowledge  is 
decreasing in heterogeneity of the group. 
 
We then bring these implications to the data, using a survey conducted in 2003 
by the OECD-PISA consortium. In this survey students express their preferences 
towards competitive or cooperative learning. We study the correlation between 
these  attitudes,  family  background  and  student  test  scores.  We  show  that 
competitive  attitudes  are  increasing  in  the  observable  component  of  ability   19 
(parental  education  and  occupation).  In  addition,  even  when  controlling  for 
additional  aspects  of  family  background,  we  show  that  student  test  scores  (a 
reasonable  proxy  for  knowledge)  are  positively  correlated  with  competitive 
attitudes and negatively correlated with cooperative ones. However, the situation 
is  reverted  when  we  take  into  account  the  peers’  attitudes:  learning  in  a 
competitive  environment  is  detrimental  to  knowledge,  while  a  cooperative 
environment favours individual performance. 
 
We  also  analyse  whether  these  conclusions,  as  predicted  by  our  model,  are 
strengthened  in  more  homogenous  environments,  which  are  represented  by 
tracked educational systems. We find that tracked systems raise substantially 
the returns to cooperation both at individual and at aggregate level, probably 
thanks to a greater homogeneity of the student body.  
 
Finally,  we  have  investigated  whether  these  average  returns  tend  to  vary 
according  to  the  student  level  of  performance  in  test  scores.  We  find  that 
individual  incentives  to  compete  are  increasing  in  student  performance, 
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics – PISA 2003 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Test score in mathematics  99,727  530.403  84.839  192.740  848.995 
Female  99,727  0.515  0.500  0  1 
Age  99,727  15.796  0.287  15.170  16.420 
Highest parental occupational status  99,727  50.417  16.072  16  90 
Highest parental education in years of schooling  99,727  13.380  2.850  0  17 
Computer facilities at home  99,727  0.236  0.893  -1.676  1.051 
Index of home possessions  99,727  0.174  0.922  -3.787  1.940 
Hours All homework  99,727  6.214  5.648  0  30 
How many books at home  99,727  3.709  1.358  1  6 
Student/teacher ratio  99,727  13.584  4.630  1.379  70 
School size  99,727  707.070  437.801  19  6000 
Competitive learning  99,727  -0.035  0.966  -2.844  2.450 
Co-operative learning  99,727  -0.021  0.967  -3.134  2.742 
Tracking*  99,727  0.471  0.499  0  1 
* Countries classified as tracked according to the distribution of the type of secondary school attended 
(variable PROGN): Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Russian Federation, Spain  
 
 
Table 2 – Countries included in the analysis – PISA 2003 
Country ID  Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
Australia  7,491  7.51  7.51 
Austria  1,863  1.87  9.38 
Belgium  4,935  4.95  14.33 
Canada  16,362  16.41  30.73 
Czech Republic  2,684  2.69  33.43 
Denmark  2,676  2.68  36.11 
Finland  4,563  4.58  40.69 
Germany  1,925  1.93  42.62 
Hong Kong (China)  2,329  2.34  44.95 
Hungary  2,362  2.37  47.32 
Iceland  2,531  2.54  49.86 
Ireland  1,491  1.50  51.35 
Italy  8,390  8.41  59.77 
Japan  3,681  3.69  63.46 
Korea  4,402  4.41  67.87 
Netherlands  1,229  1.23  69.10 
Norway  2,767  2.77  71.88 
Poland  3,937  3.95  75.83 
Russian Federation  3,112  3.12  78.95 
Spain  5,930  5.95  84.89 
Sweden  3,583  3.59  88.48 
Switzerland  4,410  4.42  92.91 
United Kingdom  4,914  4.93  97.83 
United States  2,160  2.17  100.00 
Total  99,727  100.00   
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Table 3 – Competitive attitude and family background – PISA 2003 
  1  2 
  complrn-cooplrn  complrn-cooplrn 
female  -0,285  -0,287 
  [36.94]***  [37.18]*** 
Highest parental occupational status  0,002   
  [6.20]***   
Highest parental education in years of schooling  0,008   
  [5.63]***   
Index of socio-economic and cultural status    0,052 
    [11.16]*** 
Australia  0,166  0,344 
  [7.34]***  [27.32]*** 
Austria  -0,369  -0,19 
  [7.46]***  [4.15]*** 
Belgium  -0,373  -0,193 
  [13.58]***  [9.98]*** 
Canada  -0,041  0,138 
  [1.73]*  [10.31]*** 
Czech Republic  -0,133  0,049 
  [4.51]***  [2.28]** 
Denmark  -0,349  -0,163 
  [10.91]***  [6.47]*** 
Finland  -0,218  -0,036 
  [7.98]***  [1.85]* 
Germany  -0,101  0,075 
  [2.52]**  [2.08]** 
Hong Kong (China)  0,102  0,284 
  [4.38]***  [15.41]*** 
Hungary  -0,384  -0,198 
  [12.55]***  [7.95]*** 
Iceland  0,502  0,671 
  [13.66]***  [22.40]*** 
Ireland  0,161  0,344 
  [4.01]***  [9.50]*** 
Italy  -0,196  -0,015 
  [7.51]***  [0.78] 
Japan  0,198  0,394 
  [6.50]***  [16.98]*** 
Korea  0,67  0,851 
  [29.79]***  [58.93]*** 
Netherlands  -0,361  -0,179 
  [11.25]***  [6.73]*** 
Norway  -0,39  -0,216 
  [10.50]***  [6.99]*** 
Poland  -0,044  0,14 
  [1.81]*  [8.42]*** 
Russian Federation  -0,051  0,14 
  [1.87]*  [7.25]*** 
Spain  -0,08  0,094 
  [3.15]***  [4.86]*** 
Sweden  0,112  0,289 
  [3.77]***  [12.57]*** 
Switzerland  -0,547  -0,365 
  [16.32]***  [12.60]*** 
United Kingdom  0,019  0,199 
  [0.74]  [10.76]*** 
United States  0,066  0,246 
  [2.01]**  [9.28]*** 
Observations  99,727  99,727 
R-squared  0.07  0.07 
Log likelihood  -152,094  -152,084 
Robust absolute value t statistics in brackets - errors clustered by school 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   24 
Table 4 – Performance in math tests  – PISA 2003 








attitude   
Female  -15.15  -18.11  -15.588 
  [22.51]***  [27.64]***  [23.47]*** 
Age of student  3.586  3.261  3.34 
  [3.76]***  [3.42]***  [3.52]*** 
Highest parental occupational status  0.723  0.726  0.723 
  [36.50]***  [36.60]***  [36.63]*** 
Highest parental education in years of schooling  1.393  1.386  1.35 
  [12.22]***  [12.21]***  [11.92]*** 
Computer facilities at home  6.762  6.832  6.733 
  [15.13]***  [15.32]***  [15.10]*** 
Index of home possessions   6.259  6.646  6.287 
  [13.31]***  [14.15]***  [13.46]*** 
Hours All homework   1.354  1.517  1.358 
  [19.24]***  [22.26]***  [19.79]*** 
How many books at home   12.276  12.208  12.19 
  [48.09]***  [48.08]***  [48.17]*** 
Teacher/student ratio  -0.307  -0.234  -0.236 
  [1.82]*  [1.43]  [1.43] 
School size  0.015  0.014  0.014 
  [9.02]***  [8.62]***  [8.61]*** 
Competitive attitude  6.414    8.928 
  [5.58]***    [9.56]*** 
Co-operative attitude  -5.712    -6.651 
  [5.35]***    [7.46]*** 
Competitive attitude x schoolsize  0.001     0 
   [0.95]     [0.00] 
Cooperative attitude x schoolsize  -0.001     -0.001 
   [1.15]     [0.78] 
Competitive attitude x student/teacher ratio  0.251     0.128 
   [3.12]***     [1.99]** 
Cooperative attitude x student/teacher ratio  -0.028     0.011 
   [0.37]     [0.17] 
Competitive attitude x tracking  -3.276    -3.474 
  [4.84]***    [6.01]*** 
Cooperative attitude x tracking  6.913    6.487 
  [11.43]***    [11.75]*** 
school average competitive attitude    -35.749  -39 
    [5.46]***  [6.01]*** 
school average cooperative attitude    15.822  18.57 
    [2.30]**  [2.75]*** 
school average competitive x tracking    3.024  3.643 
    [0.66]  [0.80] 
school average cooperative x tracking    23.442  20.555 
    [4.52]***  [4.01]*** 
school average competitive x schoolsize     0.01  0.01 
      [2.38]**  [2.35]** 
school average cooperative x schoolsize     -0.009  -0.009 
      [1.47]  [1.46] 
school average competitive x student/teacher ratio     1.661  1.594 
      [3.63]***  [3.52]*** 
school average cooperative x student/teacher ratio     -0.991  -1.004 
      [1.97]**  [2.04]** 
Observations  99,727  99,727  99,727 
R-squared  0.25  0.24  0.25 
Log likelihood  -570,310.62  -570,792.37  -570,110.68 
Robust absolute value t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
errors clustered by school – country fixed effects included   25 
 Table 5 – Performance in math tests – quantile regressions – PISA 2003 
   1  2  3 
   q25  q50  q75 
Female  -12.577  -16.472  -20.006 
   [18.37]***  [26.22]***  [27.13]*** 
Age of student  0.312  3.818  4.560 
   [0.24]  [3.70]***  [3.58]*** 
Highest parental occupational status  0.763  0.752  0.669 
   [27.35]***  [30.04]***  [27.53]*** 
Highest parental education in years of schooling  1.365  1.452  1.477 
   [10.69]***  [12.30]***  [9.90]*** 
Computer facilities at home  7.032  6.978  6.963 
   [12.59]***  [14.06]***  [13.71]*** 
Index of home possessions  7.828  6.083  3.959 
   [12.53]***  [11.59]***  [7.66]*** 
Hours All homework   1.654  1.362  1.032 
   [26.58]***  [24.52]***  [17.02]*** 
How many books at home   11.517  12.877  13.933 
   [41.24]***  [42.64]***  [41.34]*** 
Teacher/student ratio  -0.252  -0.300  -0.242 
  [2.90]***  [3.35]***  [2.63]*** 
School size  0.014  0.014  0.015 
  [12.17]***  [18.82]***  [16.37]*** 
Competitive attitude  6.553  9.907  12.627 
  [4.64]***  [9.10]***  [9.92]*** 
Co-operative attitude  -3.862  -7.499  -8.159 
  [3.44]***  [7.93]***  [6.40]*** 
Competitive attitude x schoolsize  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
   [0.06]  [0.04]  [0.64] 
Cooperative attitude x schoolsize  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
   [0.86]  [1.72]*  [1.6] 
Competitive attitude x student/teacher ratio  0.126  0.094  0.071 
   [1.3]  [1.26]  [0.84] 
Cooperative attitude x student/teacher ratio  -0.147  0.082  0.117 
   [1.61]  [1.05]  [1.26] 
Competitive attitude x tracking  -1.512  -3.786  -5.162 
  [1.97]**  [5.12]***  [7.50]*** 
Cooperative attitude x tracking  6.039  7.613  7.381 
  [7.98]***  [11.00]***  [10.55]*** 
school average competitive attitude  -42.435  -33.110  -32.603 
  [10.8]***  [9.39]***  [7.49]*** 
school average cooperative attitude  14.818  17.480  24.950 
  [3.15]***  [4.19]***  [6.52]*** 
school average competitive x tracking  4.255  7.126  5.304 
  [1.39]  [2.60]***  [2.02]** 
school average cooperative x tracking  19.696  21.563  21.070 
  [6.39]***  [6.93]***  [7.00]*** 
school average competitive x schoolsize  0.012  0.012  0.012 
   [5.32]***  [5.32]***  [4.89]*** 
school average cooperative x schoolsize  -0.012  -0.010  -0.006 
   [4.51]***  [3.61]***  [1.99]** 
school average competitive x student/teacher ratio  1.626  0.878  0.962 
   [6.02]***  [3.55]***  [3.13]*** 
school average cooperative x student/teacher ratio  -0.512  -0.846  -1.687 
   [1.51]  [2.88]***  [6.49]*** 
Observations  99,727 
R-squared  0.1325  0.1421  0.1447 
Bootstrap absolute value t statistics in brackets (100 replications) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country fixed effects included   26 





















































































































































































































































































Note. The graph shows the fixed effects estimated in Table 3. (T) indicates tracked educational systems.   27 
Figure 2 – Quantile regressions: returns to cooperative/competitive attitudes – PISA 2003 
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